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Yanni Kotsonis, States of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship in The Russian Empire
and Early Soviet Republic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014. Pp. XIX +
483; Illustrations. Notes. Index. £XX (hardback). ISBN 978 1 4426 4354 3
Many have portrayed death and taxes as life’s only certainties. Kotsonis’
book masterfully disrupts many of our certainties about Russian history by
examining taxation as a nexus of key categories (state, economy, and people), and
the role taxation played in the mutually constitutive processes whereby the modern
state, the modern economy, and the modern population came into existence. In
Russia, perhaps even more than in other states, ‘new kinds of taxes helped define
[create] these categories, introduced a fundamental duality to each of them, and put
each in tension with the others’ (8). The modern imperial state thrived on these
dualities (particularly those involving personhood) and the new Bolshevik regime
attempted to eliminate them once and for all (thereby acting as a truly new regime
built upon the foundation prepared by the fiscal practices of the old).
Readers will be surprised at the extent to which an empire built on
particularisms actively pursued the same universalist agenda found in other states,
and at the extent to which, at least in terms of the non-peasant population, the
Russian state was neither under-governed nor radically different from its more
representational peers. In the end, the bountiful and meticulously presented
evidence of the intent with which the autocracy created the society it sought to
govern in a program of tax reform makes Lenin’s State and Revolution seem rather
well rooted in the actual lived experience of pre-revolutionary urban society.
Taxation brought all non-peasants into the state and acculturated them to
participation—not as representatives, but as citizens nonetheless.
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Chapters 1-2 lay out the comparative intellectual background and outlines of
the process by which Russian state and society mutually constituted each other in
the process of taxation. From avoiding direct contact with the payer in the 1860s
and 1870s (mostly because it lacked the information to do so), the state shifted
toward direct taxation of individuals in the 1880s. Chapters 3-6 detail the
implementation of direct taxes that transcended the payer’s old regime estate
identity by avoiding the person and ultimately changed the system from the
apportioned taxation of aggregates and collectives to the calculated and
proportional taxation of non-peasant individuals. Taxes on land, commercial
registrations and transactions, inheritance, and urban real estate leveraged the
state’s position as guarantor of contracts and creator of juridical corporate persons
to induce financial transparency and discipline the population, making the payment
of taxes and participation in mutual surveillance a mark of citizenship. Taxes that
initially yielded modest sums became major sources of state revenue by 1913
because of the wealth of economic information they generated. One merchant’s
declared exemption revealed another’s income. Small registration fees revealed
sources of other, greater, revenue. One apartment dweller’s rent indicated the
potential income of others in the building. What began with the creation of a tax
inspectorate and urban tax commissions in 1885 paved the way for the discussion
and ultimate introduction of personal income taxes after 1905.
The appeal of the income tax after the 1905 crisis, and its enactment in 1916,
is key to the book’s main premise that the state consciously used tax policy to create
the citizens it sought to govern and incorporate them into the state. After the 1905’s
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violence, experts and officials presented the progressive personal income tax as a
tool of socio-political cohesion and stability—an equality of inclusive citizenship
within the state that avoided the thorny question of representation by offering
social justice through its universality. This rendered even parliamentary Britain and
autocratic Russia much alike, as states everywhere defined citizenship in terms of
fiscal obligations and opened up the final assault of this new civic nation on the last
remnants of the old regime found in the wealth of the British peerage, Prussian
Junkers, and the Romanov family itself (except for the emperor). Against the
background of revolution, propertied classes saw in the income tax a new means for
the state to guarantee the safety of their person and property by schooling the mob
in civilized state participation, while those on the left saw it as a milestone of civic
inclusion for their constituents. After 1905 the income tax, like the state statistics
that helped make it possible, offered the possibility of social and political stability
through inclusion in a society of equivalent and measureable individuals (199). War
added fiscal necessity to the appeal of stability after 1914.
Chapters 7-9 relate to taxing the peasantry, or rather dealing with the
majority of the population that the state never managed to include and mobilize by
fiscal means. Peasant taxation was never direct, let alone proportional, and the
excise tax gleaned from the production and sale of vodka embroiled the state in
moral questions connected to public health that cast it as a villain in the public eye.
While the taxation of all others had evolved into a modern relationship with and
within the state in which taxes were more and more direct and progressive, peasant
taxation remained estate based, apportioned, and repartitional, with peasants taxed

3

as aggregates and collectives instead of as individuals. The state assessed taxes
based on limited information and remained little concerned with how the bills were
allocated to and within peasant communities and households. This exacerbated the
division between peasant and non-peasant Russia into something more profound
than the nobility’s preference for French over Russian in polite conversation or even
income differences. Non-peasants were brought into the state, while peasants were
not. For non-peasants taxes were unavoidable and a mark of citizenship enforced
by acculturated discipline, peer pressure and the threat of state coercion. For
peasants, taxes were easily avoided, as evidenced by the whole question of arrears
(which were built into the system), and ‘coercive to the core,’ (244) in that they
were arbitrarily enforced by confiscations and beatings. From this perspective,
confiscation and beating came to represent the state’s most direct relationship with
the individual peasant.
Furthermore, even though peasant taxes had been reduced to a minuscule
portion of overall state revenue by 1913 (2% or less) as the state shifted its
attention to the more transparent and vibrant commercial economy, simply
abolishing taxes on peasants was impossible because it would mean cutting the only
primary connection peasants had to the state (244). The great success that the state
achieved in making state and non-peasant society mutually constitutive was
accompanied by colossal failure in relation to the empire’s peasant majority. After
1914, there began a steady and constant collision between an ‘urban system of
discipline, individuation, and inescapability’ and a peasant society whose
relationship with the state was still rooted in ‘collectivism, apportioned bills, and
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evasion’ that thus ‘placed a high political and civic expectation on a peasant
population that had never been prepared for anything other than obscurity and
shirking’ (23). This was real under-government.
The concluding chapters (10-12) follow the story of taxation and citizenship
into the new Soviet regime. Primed with a population already acculturated to state
economic activism, abundant statist-minded experts, and a model of taxation as an
instrument of civic inclusion, the Soviets initially tried to complete the imperial
state’s project by extending the universalism of income taxation to the peasantry full
scale. The Bolsheviks’ relationship with the peasantry was thus an encounter
between the type of citizenship constructed for non-peasants under autocracy (a
universalism they embraced) and the peasants previously excluded. Peasants
responding with typical evasion encountered a state more willing to use coercion to
ensure its own survival. This was War Communism. In the end, peasants sent the
Bolsheviks back to the same starting point as their predecessors, as the NEP
introduced a number of smaller assessments, such as licensure fees, designed as
much to collect information about peasant income and draw the rural population
into state activity as they were to secure revenue.
This dense work is obligatory reading for specialists and their graduate
students. It opens the door to new questions related to the means by which state,
population, and economy intersect in Russia and elsewhere. The author and press
are to be congratulated for blessing us with these intellectual provocations.
David W. Darrow
University of Dayton

5

